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In World Politics and Personal Insecurity
Harold Lasswell's manifesto for an internationale of
scholars, he derided the ivory towerists. They were
engaged, he said, in "a compulsive neurotic ritual of
collecting, ordering, condensing, and expelling data"'
and, "aside from modest incomes and great deference
from other compulsive personality types . . .[and]
oral erotics," they were ignoring "the political
implications".1 Harold refused to ignore the power
consequences of scholarship: "The act of emitting
vocabulary in public places, like a university,
creates a pattern which diffuses with greater or
lesser rapidity along the channels of communica-
tion."2 And with a characteristic irony, he took
responsibility for and gave direction to those poli-
tical implications: "The hope of the professors of
social science, if not of the world, lies in the
competitive strength of an elite based on vocabulary,
footnotes, questionnaires, and conditioned responses,
against an elite based on vocabulary, poison gas,
property, and family prestige."3 The lawyer is a
unique blend of scholar and activist, of contemplation
and manipulation, to use Harold's words. With Harold's
program, it was hardly surprising that he saw in law
and lawyers a subject for inquiry and for education,
and that he chose to settle at the Yale Law School to
pursue his study of authority.
Harold was, par excellence, the expert on power,
but he hardly underestimated authority. Of his
fortuitous meeting with Myres McDougal, he remarked
that he needed "an associate . . . who could overcome
the difficulties in delimiting the 'authority' component
of the power process." With control and authority one
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could both understand and influence, Harold's
tactical objectives. In Power and Personality
he wrote, "[Tihe inquiry is not an end of itself. We
have a sociopolitical objective, the more perfect
instrumentation of democratic values. . . . [A] further
step is the consideration of how to put what we have
learned in the service of human dignity. '4 He was
interested in developing a theory which not only
could increase understanding of how power was used
institutionally to secure the shaping and sharing of
all other values, but also could increase the skill
of those wishing to use power to create a world public
order of human dignity. Happily, he found in McDougal
the collaborator who shared those goals and had the
complementary skills in an abundance and quality to
match his own. Together they forged a jurisprudence
for the contemporary decision specialist, committed
to a public order of human dignity.
The lawyer, Harold taught, is a specialist in
making choices, in creating choice-making institutions
for his communities and in making those institutions
produce wise and effective choices at the right times.
Any praxis of choice-making, Harold insisted, must
include (i) a notion of the self, observing and acting,
(ii) the accuracy and relevance of the way that the
self looks at things as well as (iii) the accuracy and
relevance of its selection of things to look at and,
(iv) with all of this irrformation, some systematic way
of making choices. If the specialist is intellectually
responsible, he will want this praxis to be rational
and efficient. If the specialist is responsible and
moral, he will be certain to test the content of his
alternate choices and the aggregate effects they are
likely to precipitate against clearly expressed social
goals. Harold's systematic exposition of these ideas
was his jurisprudence.
Harold's focus from his earliest work was on
human beings, understood in all their complexity,
making choices through time -- people, institutions and
values. His jurisprudence built on this schema and
applied it prescriptively as a method for locating the
self in the comprehensive flow of events, for clarify-
ing goals, refining foci, articulating maps of social
process, and developing a sequence of choice-making
("the intellectual tasks of decision") which would




First, then, there was the question of
observational standpoint and scrutiny of the self.
Perhaps more obviously in law than in other
disciplines, the individual is the ultimate instru-
ment of observation, evaluation and choice as well
as the ultimate target of decision. Harold admon-
ished the scholar and decision-maker to examine his
self-system scrupulously. As an early member of the
psychoanalytic movement, Harold had fought for the
utility and legitimacy of this method of inquiry,
and he applied it to the decision-making context
with extraordinary effect. Yet it was hardly a
slavish adoption. Harold was in favor of what he
called the "sociologizing" of Freud, and he used
that master's work creatively and innovatively.
But he was no popularizer or simplifier, and his was
hardly an easy method. In an Afterword to P-tchQ-
pathology and Politics some thirty years after its
first appearance, Harold wrote coolly but movingly
of the moral and emotional problems his research
method presented and, in particular, the stirring
of imperfectly resolved neuroses and anxieties in
the researcher himself. It may be the only time that
Harold shared an anguish, and even that was character-
istically dignified and considerate of his readers--
not a complaint, but a caveat to those who followed.
Then there was the question of fQcus, of how
to look at things, of which lenses to fit into the
instruments of observation. With Myres McDougal, he
insisted that scholarly emphasis be balanced between
perspectives and operations, between what people said
and thought and what they actually did. And, of course,
he adapted and invented new and profound methods for
doing both. Behavior, whether individual or mass,
became subject to refined indicators for measuring or
charting over time. Words were analyzed for both latent
and manifest content and thought patterns subjected to
Harold's distinctive methods of psychoanalysis.
A special part of Harold's brilliance was his
simultaneous appreciation of effective power and of
authority, of deeds and symbols, his capacity to study
each separately but to integrate them in political
analysis. The distinction was drawn clearly in Harold's
Politics5 and thereafter became a fundamental strut of
5. H. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW
(1950).
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his thought. With McDougal, Harold insisted that both
authority and control be studied and that the word
"law" be reserved for processes of decision that were
both authoritative and controlling. This single insight
may prove to be one of the most important legacies of
the New Haven school, for its discipline prevents the
scholar from slipping into the fantasy worlds of
semantic law or of naked power.
Some decisions are essentially about decision-
making itself, about the establishment and maintenance
of the indispensable institutions for making decisions.
In a documentary sense, this is the Constitution,
frequently assumed to be a sacred talisman to be
revered as holy writ and construed in accord with the
assumed intentions of the drafters. The futility of
this approach is obvious to the historian: "all history,"
Croce said, "is contemporary". In the same sense, all
constitutions are contemporary. To look at it otherwise
is to sterilize contemporaneous democracy. Harold and
his collaborators insisted that the focus be redirected
to the process of decisions--the constitutive process--
a reorganization of focus as radical as that wrought by
Copernicus.
In World Politi-cs Harold wrote, "Whatever is
relevant to significant change is relevant to the con-
figurative analysis of politics." 6 Harold's field in-
cluded all value processes, and his concern was the
shaping and sharing of values to create his commonwealth
of human dignity. This conception, perforce, took him
far beyond the traditional study of political science,
the respectful contemplation of the apparatus of the
state. But there never was any tendency toward a type
of intellectual totalitarianism. On the contrary,
Harold distinguished between a public order, where norms
were sustained by comparatively intense sanctions, and
a civic order, where norms were maintained by compara-
tively mild sanctions. His preference was for as
broad a civic order as possible, an inclination manifest
in his brilliant work on sanctioning theory and on human
rights. His concern for the autonomy of the individual
was such that we sometimes called him an anarchist.
Harold was as concerned with the object of his
focus as with the focus components. His "cognitive map"
6. H.. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY
17 (1935).
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of phase analysis of relevant processes, his sequential
analysis of decision functions and his value analysis
were integrated into a comprehensive and dynamic flow
of social, community, power and authoritative processes
at any level of organization. They constitute an
intellectual tour de force of boundless learning and
imaginative integration, transformed into a powerful
tool for analysis and decision-making. But they would
have remained static and contemplative without a praxis
of choice-making. For this Harold conceived the
decision-specialist's five intellectual tasks, the
executive branch of the Lasswell-McDougal enterprise
and a major legacy for lawyers and policy scientists.
Briefly, Harold saw rational purposive choice-making
as comprising five sequential operations: goal clari-
fication, trend study, factor analysis, future pro-
jections and the invention of alternatives. He sought
to clarify policy and method for each of these tasks
in order to increase the rationality and efficiency of
decision.
Harold saw law and politics as purposive
activities; the content of purpose became a pre-eminent
consideration. With his conception of a manifold and
integrated reality, Harold insisted that goals be speci-
fied, not for a single key variable, but for all
values in his preferred public order of human dignity
and for all phases of the constitutive process on
through to the preferred psychopersonal organization
of the self. Goal clarification became coterminous with
the very limits of the earth-space arena. Goals were
to be specified for each value and each phase and to
be interrelated; the method was postulation rather than
derivation. A moral decision was to be appraised in
terms of the conformity of effects to goals and not
simply by justifications to principle. Once postulated,
goals became susceptible to empirical testing for trends
toward or away from their approximation, for the identi-
fication of conditioning factors affecting the trends,
for projection of alternative future flows tested for
their degree of conformity to goals, and to the invention
of alternatives. Thus preference could be removed from
a fantasy world and made into a powerful instrument of
social intervention and appraisal, the major public
functions of the lawyer. Intervention into the lives
of others is a serious responsibility, and Harold's
method made it more responsible, for it permitted the
lawyer to test alternatives for their aggregate conse-
quences on all the interrelated and now specified and
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operational goals of public order.
Past trends in decision are studied to determine
the extent to which particular goals have been achieved,
for the factors which conditioned them, and as spring-
boards for extrapolation and invention. If past deci-
sions are given a normative or even sacramental force
in a goal-oriented context, there is often a temptation,
at some'level of consciousness, to fashion a trend to
support a goal. "The falseness of an opinion," wrote
Nietzsche, "is not for us any objection to it ....
The question is how far it is life-furthering, life-
preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-creating."
But Harold never put himself beyond good and evil. His
realism, honesty and respect for the truth made his
trend studies meticulous; he never hesitated to report
negative or contradictory trends.
Harold's demand for accuracy in understanding
decision trends outstripped extant methodology. He
reached into other disciplines and adapted and invented--
propaganda analysis and then content analysis, the
adaptation of psychoanalytical methods to political
science, the use of indicators and so on. He had no
patience for the neo-scholastic fascination with a method
and the cultivation of virtuosity in it for its own sake.
Method was only a means. The test of the quality of
the tool and the skill of the hand of the craftsman
wielding it was its product. Did it contribute to a
detailed and contextual description of the past trend
of decision?
Harold had a special interest in the environment
of conditions in which decisions were made. Traditionally,
the lawyer's artifacted conception of a past decision
was a judgment, abstracted from context. Other than as
a talisman, that conception offered little utility to
Harold. Trends in past decision were useful to the
projection of future possibilities and the invention of
alternatives only if the factors which conditioned those
decisions could be identified. Harold's contextual
theory permitted him to avoid the sterile debate on
"causality" and to reconstruct the complex of environ-
mental and predispositional factors which had influenced
past decisions.
Obviously, the decision specialist bent on
influencing trends in social process must develop some
idea of what the future may hold if he mounts no inter-
vention. Other scholars apparently assumed that there
was such a thing as "the future" inchoate, in the wings,
down the line and they actually sought to prophesy this
thing that would be. While Harold was interested in
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techniques for extrapolating past trends, his conception
and methodology of the intellectual task of projection
of future trends were radically different. Harold
invented the method of developmental constructs, the
conscious invention of a spectrum of futures which
ranged from the most desirable future, approximating
the goal values of human dignity, to the least desirable
future. These possible futures were projected,
providing artificial touch points against which the
sonar of the decision-maker could be beamed as he moved
through a continuous present, thus providing both
indications of the degree of success of particular
strategies for achieving or avoiding particular futures
and signals of when to change strategies to increase
approximation to goals. Harold's constructs were
designed as tools, but many may have become important
literary legacies of our culture. His construct of a
public order of human dignity is at once a realistic
and a luminous vision of what the city of man can be.
His contruct of the garrison state has served as a
frightening reminder of the consequences of ominous
tendencies in this century.
An indispensable task of the decision specialist
is the invention of alternatives that might lead to a
closer approximation to preferred goals. Harold's
creativity was dazzling and of great practical value to
lawyers. Harold was as unimpressed with these
virtuoso performances as we were impressed. He had a
secular conception of creativity; it was, as he said,
simply extending your own and others' cognitive maps.
He was interested in systematic techniques for develop-
ing and increasing creativity.
Harold's work on standpoint, focus and an
appropriately contextual map, and his brilliant rendi-
tion of the five intellectual tasks made him the
decision specialist of the century. But consideration
of Harold's awesome and monumental work can overshadow
Harold, the person. Harold was a superior man, fine
and refined in taste, in humor and in bearing. He was
always gracious and considerate of others, in his
success and in his final trial. He was a great man in
every way.
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To study with Harold was a privilege. To work
with him and be his friend was that and more. It was
an honor, an invitation to continued learning and
personal growth, to a stream of intellectual riches
dispensed with generosity, and an opportunity to
participate in work that was moral in the highest sense
of that word.
